* We thank seminar participants at the ESA meeting and the University of Pennsylvania for helpful suggestions, Colin Camerer for his insightful comments on an earlier draft, and Christophe Van den Bulte for his suggestions and advice on data analysis. We are especially grateful to Karen Jehn for her early collaboration and ideas. This research is partially supported by NSF Grant SBR 9730187 and the Reginald Jones Center of Management at the Wharton School. We also thank three anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments that substantially improve the quality of this paper.
INTRODUCTION
Graham Greene aptly captured the centrality of trust to social relations when he wrote, "It is impossible to go through life without trust: that is to be imprisoned in the worst cell of all, oneself" (1943) . Centrality generally begets complexity, and trust is no exception --discussed by Chinese philosophers 3,000 years ago, a definitive definition still does not exist (see Kramer and Tyler, 1996 and Snijders and Kerem, 1999 for comprehensive reviews). Despite this stubborn intractability, trust is one of a handful of concepts to transcend territorial barriers of social disciplines; sociologists, anthropologists, economists, and psychologists study it.
In general, the social sciences view trust as an emergent process fundamental in social interaction and market efficiency (Creed & Miles, 1994; Etzioni, 1988) . Without trust, opportunism rules and social exchange is costly. Despite the costs of trusting when others are untrustworthy, establishing trust can greatly benefit those involved (Axelrod, 1984) . Some psychologists claim trust is the hallmark of social adjustment (Gurtman, 1992; Erickson, 1963) and without it neuroses prevail. Sociologists generally believe social relations and obligation are more important than morality, contracts, or institutions, in trust production (Granovetter, 1985; Shapiro, 1987; Uzzi, 1996) . Most economists view trust rationally and posit people only trust when it pays (Camerer and Weigelt, 1988; Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe, 1995) .
Arguably, trust delivers its greatest social value as a linchpin to low-cost cooperative behavior. It holds immense strategic value for any size group or organization. Monitoring and incentives can motivate cooperative behavior, but at a higher cost. Organizational researchers theorize and empirically show trust reduces managerial monitoring, decreasing costs while increasing individual effort. (Ring & Van de Ven, 1992; McAllister, 1995; Chiles & McMackin, 1996 , Uzzi, 1996 . Trust often results in social gains, prompting some to suggest it leads to prosperity in society (Fukuyama, 1995) .
Like religion, trust requires a leap of faith. As Bradach and Eccles (1989) note, [The faith to believe] "where opportunism might be rationally expected, trust prevails." Some social biologists believe humans are genetically programmed not to trust or be trustworthy except for kin (Wright, 1995) . This is echoed by the dominant assumption in game theoretic equilibrium analysis of self-interest seeking and not trustworthy individuals (Myerson, 1991) . Clearly, if people trust and others are not trustworthy, they exact a heavy toll from the trusting.
Consequently, the existence of trusting and trustworthy behaviors is problematic.
Though problematic, we observe trusting and trustworthy behavior in others: A colleague who borrows a book and returns it. Or, a pedestrian crosses the street in the face of oncoming traffic because of a "stop sign". In a seminal paper, Granovetter (1985) suggests three mechanisms to induce trust and trustworthiness: 1) institutional mechanisms, 2) social networks and relations, and 3) generalized morality.
Institutional mechanisms are put forth primarily by neoclassical economists (Alchian and Demsetz, 1973; Williamson, 1975; Rosen, 1982) to help explain trusting and trustworthy behavior by self-interested people within the classical framework of utility maximization. They rationalize that mechanisms such as explicit contracts, incentive schemes, and hierarchical authority can induce individual behavior consistent with trust and trustworthiness. In this world, trust is used not to explain behavior, but to label it (Craswell, 1993) . 1 To trust or not is purely calculative; institutional mechanisms help individuals act as if they do trust, usually because they increase the costs of opportunistic behavior. As Granovetter (1985) aptly notes, such mechanisms do not produce trust but are functional substitutes for it.
On the other hand, Granovetter (1985) posits that concrete personal relations are an important determinant of trusting behavior. This so-called "embeddedness" argument emphasizes the role of social networks and reputation arising from interpersonal contacts. The higher the embeddedness of the social relation, the more likely (on average), trust is extended, and returned. Granovetter suggests embeddedness is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for generating trusting behavior. General population-level reputation is significantly less important than individualized reputations generated by direct prior contacts, because direct contacts provide more reliable information of others' intentions. Granovetter clearly states (p.
506) the inclusion of such relations in the trust decision does not call for the abandonment of a rational decision-making process. Instead, the degree of embeddedness should be factored into such models, for example, as with a matching protocol (e.g., Ellison, 1993) .
Granovetter terms the third mechanism "generalized morality". Generalized morality consists of rules and norms of behavior fundamental to society, without which collective action is impossible. These rules of social interaction are so ingrained (or internalized) that individuals follow them automatically. They are treated as cultural phenotypes, similar to the genetic ones passed from generation to generation. For example, in American cities most children know not to accept a ride from strangers. These fundamental rules of behavior are not static, but evolve through social interaction and feedback from within the population. Thirty years ago males went to baseball games dressed in shirts and ties. Today, such a dress code is close to extinction.
Such changes in behavioral rules are governed by evolution dynamics. Rules receiving positive feedback (or high phenotype fitness) are more likely to survive and reproduce.
Consequently, it is important to isolate institutional mechanisms, social embeddedness, and generalized morality in order to determine their relative influence in the trust building process. In this paper, we create an experimental setting where there is no institutional mechanism and minimal scope for social embeddedness. Such a setting allows us to study the effect of generalized morality on trust building when subjects of a sub-population have a oneshot interaction with each member of another sub-population.
In our experiments, subjects are strangers. They interact anonymously and only play each other once. Contracting is not possible, and in fact, subjects never find out with whom they play the trust game. 2 The novel game has additional desirable features. It allows us to untangle trusting and trustworthy behavior; it has multiple stages, which allow subjects to detect the intention of others; and mutual trusting behavior leads to sizable social gains.
This paper aims to answer five basic research questions. First, can strangers generate trust and trustworthy behavior? Our experimental design allows us to quantify the extent to which these behaviors exist in our population. Second, how does the potential of future social gains influence current trusting behavior? This potential varies across the stages of our trust game. Third, does better knowledge of others' trusting behavior make people more trustworthy?
Within our game, the uncertainty of intent of trusting players varies. Fourth, is trusting behavior dependent on stake size? In three sessions, we increase the stake size tenfold to see whether this increase affects trusting behavior. Lastly, do evolutionary paths of trust building differ across sub-populations? Specifically, do the trust dynamics of the sub-population who invests and initiates the trust building process differ from the one with the first decision rights to terminate the process?
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our trust building game.
Section 3 develops hypotheses using theories of trusting and trustworthy behavior from 2 We use student subjects. It is possible that some students may know each other prior to the experiment. Thus, they are strictly not strangers. We define strangers here to mean people who engage in anonymous and one-shot sociology, economics, and psychology. Experimental design is presented in Section 4 and results in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the methodological issues, explores theoretical implications of results, and suggests future research directions.
A TRUST BUILDING GAME
Our trust building game is shown in FIGURE 1. 3 The game consists of 4 decision stages, and is played between two players; one designated as "Red", the other as "Blue". Akin to the real world, individual property rights are voluntarily given up in exchange for potential social gain.
Red moves first. She can either "trust" Blue and pass, or choose not to trust and choose down. If down is chosen, Red exercises her property rights and unilaterally decides how to split the payoff of 4 (rewarding herself with 4a (0 < a < 1), while Blue receives 4(1-a)), and the game is over. If Red trusts, she passes, thereby giving up her property rights in hopes of sharing future social gains. Social gains occur because the payoff doubles, though BLUE now owns the property rights. That is, Blue must now make a similar decision of whether to trust or not. If Blue trusts in decision stage 2, he passes. If Blue does not trust, he takes and splits the payoff so he receives 8 b (0 < b < 1) and Red receives a payoff of 8 (1-b). Similar to Glaeser et al. (2000) , we measure BLUE's level of trustworthiness by the amount returned to RED. The higher the returned amount, the more trustworthy is BLUE. The game is over if Blue does not trust. If
Blue trusts, and passes, we again double social gain to 16 in stage 3.
Then Red again must decide to trust or not. If RED does not trust, she takes, and must interaction. 3 While our trust building game looks like the centipede game (see Rosenthal, 1982; McKelvey and Palfrey, 1992) , there is an important difference. In our game, the player can choose to be either trustworthy or not while in the centipede game, players are forced to be not trustworthy. In sum, we measure the degree of trusting behavior by the proportion of "passes" in stages 1 -3. We denote these proportions by x, y, and z respectively. The degree of trustworthiness at each stage is represented by the proportions a, b, c, and d respectively.
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The game has several desirable features for examining the trust-building process. Unlike some previous trust games (e.g. Bolle, 1995, Yamagishi, Cook, and Watabe, 1998) , our game allows an individual to exhibit both trusting and trustworthy behavior. Subject decisions in each stage consist of two components -strategy choice (to trust or not) 5 and payoff choice (to be trustworthy or not). Strategy choice determines whether a subject trusts (pass) or not (take).
Payoff choice determines whether the subject is trustworthy. 6 Hence, one can be trusting but not trustworthy.
Second, our trust game allows subjects to reveal their trustworthiness. Previous games force subjects to choose between two payoff choices, which might not coincide with their most preferred choice (for example in McKelvey and Palfrey 1992, subjects are forced to claim 80% 4 We implicitly assume the measure of trustworthiness is stage-independent. That is, b=0.6 and c = 0.6 represent equivalent trustworthiness behaviors in stages 2 and 3. An alternative view could allow trustworthiness measures to be stage-dependent. For example, RED in stage 3 may feel she is partly responsible for the larger payoff of 16 by passing to BLUE in stage 1 and therefore is entitled to a larger proportion of the payoff. Hence, the level of trustworthiness in stage 2 and 3 could be equivalent even if c > b. This latter view suggests that players will take more for themselves in later stages for the same degree of trustworthiness. Thus, our proportions c and d provide a lower bound for the degree of trustworthiness in stage 3 and 4. We find no evidence to support a stage-dependent view because players do not seem sensitive to history within a game round (to be discussed in Section 5). 5 Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995) suggest one can cooperate but not trust, for the use of external mechanisms can compel others to cooperate. For example, a team leader can punish those who won't cooperate. Members may not trust each other, but they prefer cooperation to the punishment for non-cooperation. No external mechanisms or authorities enforce punishment in our design. To trust or not is solely an individual's decision. 6 Strictly speaking, RED's payoff choice in the first stage is not an indication of her trustworthy behavior because she is endowed with the payoff, and it is not a consequence of social gain from trust. Also, BLUE's strategy choice in stage 4 is not an indication of trust because property rights are last exchanged in stage 3. We discuss this further in Section 3.2. Because RED knows BLUE will not give back control of property rights, RED is clearly hoping to of the property rights. The same thing can be said about most studies of repeated prisoner's dilemma). So subjects may choose the better of two evils. Because subjects in our game can divide the social gain in any way, they choose their most preferred level of trustworthiness.
With the multi-stage design, we can study how future social gains might influence the trust building process. For example, if higher future social gains induce more trusting behavior,
we will see more passes in earlier decision stages. The design also allows us to test processbased trust, a widely identified trust process in sociological work (Zucker, 1986) , while controlling for institutional and person-based trust.
Our game shares similarities with other trust games -it is a two-person game and trusting results in social gains. It also differs from them in several important ways. For example, our trust game is different from a prisoner's dilemma (PD) game with an option to exit (PDO). In our game, "trusting" at each stage means giving up the property rights -the truster has no control over the payoff realization if the trustee chooses to end the game at the next stage. In the PDO game, choosing to play does not mean the trustee has no influence over the expected payoffs. A player who chooses to play the game or "trust" can still guarantee herself a nonnegative payoff by choosing defection (as in Orbell and Dawes 1991; . Second, our game gives the trustee (subject) a complete freedom to divide the property rights as he wishes. The outcomes of the PDO game are determined by the experimenter, not subjects 7 .
Similarly, there are other trust games that are closely related to ours (e.g., Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe, 1995, Bolle, 1995; Glaeser, et al., 2000) . These dictator-type trust games also give get a "fair split" of the social gains. She must believe that BLUE is trustworthy. 7 This "selective play" paradigm literature shows that social welfare increases when subjects have a freedom to choose between playing or not playing a particular Prisoner's Dilemma game. These increases occur because intending cooperators are more likely to enter such games relative to intending defectors, resulting in a better chance of cooperative outcomes. Consequently, the welfare of intending cooperators is higher than that of intending defectors (Orbell, Schwartz-Shea and Simmons, 1984; Orbell and Dawes, 1991; Morikawa, Orbell and Runde, 1995; Hayashi and Yamagishi, 1998) .
trustees complete control in division of social welfare. However they are single-staged. The trustee (the dictator) is never asked to relinquish control once given to her. Consequently, they can only study initial stages of the trust building process.
HYPOTHESES

RATIONALITY AND SOCIAL UNCERTAINTY
A standard assumption in game-theoretic equilibrium analysis is that individuals are rational (they are self-interested and monetary maximizing). Consequently, they cannot be entrusted with property rights if there is no chance for penalizing untrustworthy behavior (either through formal institutional mechanisms or informal sanctions of social relations). This game-theoretic reasoning is as follows: If stage 4 is reached in our game, a rational BLUE player will keep the property entrusted to him for himself and take 32 (i.e., d = 1). A rational RED player, knowing this, will neither trust BLUE nor be trustworthy. Hence, she will take the entire payoff of 16 in Sociologists expect less trusting with higher levels of social uncertainty. Kollock (1994) and Yamagishi, Cook and Watabe (1998) indicate social uncertainty exists when 1) the trustee has an incentive to impose harm or cost on the truster 2) the truster is uncertain about whether the trustee will actually impose this harm or cost. Our design imposes high levels of social uncertainty on subjects by decreasing the probability of committed relations. Committed relations reduce social uncertainty in two ways: 1) committed partners accumulate information about each other (i.e., mutual monitoring) and 2) reciprocity is possible (i.e., mutual hostages or Tit-For-Tat) (Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 1994) . Our experiment makes any degree of commitment in a relation almost impossible. In fact, it provides an estimate of the degree of trusting behavior in a population of strangers. Subjects play against each other at most once (i.e., they are strangers), each subject only assumes the role of either a RED or BLUE player, RED and BLUE players are in different rooms, and players are not told with whom they are matched.
Consequently, we expect subjects to have a high level of social uncertainty. In our experiments, there is neither a way to reveal the identity nor a disincentive to penalize untrustworthy individuals. The act of being untrustworthy is known only to the untrustworthy subject and the one whose trust was betrayed. And, the two will never meet again in the future. So there are no formal or informal mechanisms available to punish an untrustworthy player. The lack of monitoring and penalty increases the probability of opportunism. Consequently, we expect less trustworthy behavior. The above reasoning suggests the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a: Proportions b = c =d =1. That is, individuals are not trustworthy (i.e., they are opportunistic).
Hypothesis 1b: Proportions x = y = z = 0. That is, individuals exhibit zero trust; they do not give up property rights.
INFORMED RECIPROCITY
There is a subtle difference between trusting behaviors in the first two stages and the third. A BLUE player who receives the property rights from a RED player in stage 3 can infer unambiguously the intention of RED. By passing, RED clearly indicates her belief of the Blue's trustworthiness, for the only decision facing BLUE is one of trustworthiness. The same thing cannot be said for trusting behavior in stage 1 or 2. We cannot unambiguously infer players who relinquish their property rights in these earlier stages believe others are trustworthy. Players, who
give up their property rights in stages 1 and 2, have the opportunity to regain future larger property rights. Consequently, there is greater social uncertainty in the earlier stages for the trustee. Do subjects give up property rights because they believe others are trustworthy, or for cultivating "pseudo-trust"? Pseudo trust occurs when one trusts to increase property rights for the possibility of claiming them in the later stages. Because players are better informed about intentions of trusting subjects in stage 3 relative to stages 1 and 2, we expect a greater level of trustworthiness in stage 4. Since BLUE can unambiguously detect and interpret the intention of RED in stage 3, he can selectively be more trustworthy to those who trust not for own but for social gain. This informed reciprocity is characterized as "translucent" (Gauthier, 1986; Orbell and Dawes, 1991) , which is the degree to which one can recognize another's intention.
Consequently, individuals who are more certain of the intentions of others' trusting behaviors are more trustworthy. That is,
THE POTENTIAL VALUE OF TRUST
In each stage of the trust building game, the truster must give up his or her property rights in exchange for potential social gain. We define trust's potential value as the difference between the expected future return from trusting and the property rights currently held. The expected future return at any stage is computed given the percentages of passing and taking and the mean percentage of property rights claimed in future stages. Necessarily, the expected return for earlier stages is higher than for later ones. Hence, we expect to see less trusting behavior in later stages of the game than earlier ones. A RED player in stage 1 can take and receive a payoff of 4, but is losing the opportunity to share a potential future payoff of 32. In stage 3, this same player can take and realize a gain of 16, versus the opportunity to share a future payoff of 32.
Consequently, individuals are less trusting as the potential value of trust decreases.
Hypothesis 3: Proportion x > y > z.
HIGH-STAKE TRUST BUILDING
While relatively little research shows how the magnitude of payoffs affects trusting behaviorthough stories of soldiers who sacrifice themselves to save comrades are as old as war itself (Holmes, 1985) -the effect of financial incentives on experimental subject behavior has attracted substantial attention among social scientists. For recent reviews see Smith and Walker (1993) , Bonner et al., (1996) , Hertwig and Ortmann (1998), Jenkins, et al. (1998) and Camerer and Hogarth (1999) . While these authors examine hundreds of experiments, no definitive answer arises from them, though there is consensus on general trends. The majority of reviews find increased financial incentives have no significant impact on mean subject behavior, though they do reduce the variance across choices (Smith and Walker, 1993; Bonner et al., 1996; Camerer and Hogarth, 1999) . Hertwig and Ortmann (1998) find incentives slightly affect behavior (though most often when increased from zero). Jenkins et al. (1998) find the strongest link between incentives and performance, though most of the studies they review are one-person output tasks (e.g., coding) that measure performance on a purely quantity scale.
Another consensual finding is that incentives matter more in non-strategic than in strategic tasks. A strategic task is one where a subject's payoff depends on her actions and those of others. Non-strategic ones examine one-person decisions like the recalling of items, predicting future states, or output per time period. For example, the most recent study, Camerer and Hogarth (1999) , reports the following. They categorize fifty-eight studies as whether an increase in financial incentives did or did not significantly change mean performance. In thirtyone (53.4%) studies, they did. Of these thirty-one studies, seven (22.5%) were strategic experiments and twenty-four were non-strategic. In contrast, of the twenty-seven studies where mean performance did not change, twenty (74.1%) were strategic. Furthermore, if we categorize the 34 strategic studies into bargaining [trust building] or non-bargaining (e.g., signaling, auctions, tournaments) games, all 9 bargaining games fall into the category of increased incentives having no effect on mean performance. Camerer and Hogarth (1999) state, "… results
in Table 1 [summarizing the above results we discuss] suggest little reason to think the effects of very large incentives will be substantial." They conclude this finding is applicable to strategic decisions especially in bargaining and auctions. Consequently, we hypothesize the level of trust is not dependent on stake size.
Hypothesis 4:
The level of trust does not depend on the stake size. Proportions x, y, and z are not functions of stake size.
POPULATION LEARNING AND THE EMERGENCE OF TRUST
The logic behind hypothesis 1 is grounded in full rationality of players. Research increasingly suggests players are boundedly rational with adaptive expectations (Simon, 1957 , Fudenberg and Levine 1998 , Camerer and Ho, 1999 . These models assume actions are path dependent and self-correcting. Subjects stick to strategies, which work well in the past or experiment with previously unchosen strategies likely to improve performance. Future trusting behavior depends on its current success or relative fitness. The higher the number of trusting and trustworthy individuals in the population, the more likely trusting and trustworthy behavior increases both the payoffs of the collective and individuals. We expect trusting behavior in the population increases as its expected value (or fitness) increases. While our focus is on the evolution dynamics of group behavior, it has been shown that this group dynamics can be derived from individual learning models in which subjects modify their propensity of choosing a strategy based on its performance (see for example Friedman, 1991; Borgers and Sarin, 1997 ).
Hypothesis 5:
The emergence of trust in a population is governed by evolution dynamics. There is more trust in the population if trust has a higher relative fitness.
EXPERIMENTAL METHOD
A total of 386 subjects participated in the experiment. Subjects were recruited from undergraduate courses at National University of Singapore in Singapore (n=106), University of Pennsylvania in the United States (n=100), and from Beijing University in the People's Republic of China (n=180).
A typical experimental session consisted of twenty subjects who met in a room at a specified time. As they entered the room, they chose a bingo ball from a cage containing 20 balls numbered 1-20 (a ball chosen was not replaced). 8 The number on the ball represented his subject number. Then the instructions (Appendix I) were publicly read. After questions, "Blue" subjects (those with odd subject numbers) were asked to go to another room. "Red" subjects remained in the room. Subjects in each room were positioned so no subject could see the worksheet of another.
8 Two sessions in Singapore used 52 and 54 subjects and required a larger number of bingo balls.
Our multi-stage trust building game consisted of four stages. RED subjects made choices in Stage 1 and 3 and BLUE subjects in Stage 2 and 4. Although the game could end in any stage (when subjects chose "take"), subjects recorded their choices in both stages. We asked subjects to record their contingent strategy for two reasons. First, we reduced the data collection time and hence the potential for boredom. Second, contingent strategies help us understand subject behavior in all stages even though the actual game might end earlier.
9
Each session consisted of ten rounds and lasted for about one hour. In each round a Blue subject was paired with a Red subject (this was her pair member). Subject choices were privately made and recorded by an administrator in the room. After all subjects in both rooms chose, the two administrators met outside the rooms and recorded all choices. They then went back to their respective rooms, privately informed each subject of the choices of their pair member and the generated payoff. The administrator then announced the end of that round and the beginning of the next round. Each Blue subject was paired with a Red subject only once, so each subject had a new pair member in each round. This procedure of matching subjects rules out any possibility of a shadow of the future across rounds. 10 A RED player clearly cannot influence the action of another RED player because they never interact with each other. Also, RED cannot influence a BLUE player because she only plays with BLUE once and BLUE players never play against each other. A similar line of reasoning applies to BLUE players. This matching method however does not rule out a shadow of the future across stages within a game round. 11 After 10 rounds 9 Consequently, in Figure 2 , the total choice count in stage 3 is 1178 and in stage 4 is 662.
10 This matching protocol rules out even the triadic effects. That is, player A may want to be nice to player B because player B will be playing player C whom player A will play in the future. Clearly this is not possible in our design because players of the same color never play each other. 11 We believe our simultaneous social exchange protocol deters subjects from perceiving a shadow of the future within a game round because subjects must submit a full contingent strategy without knowing the strategies of others. As discussed in Section 5, we test this belief by running additional experiments using a sequential social exchange protocol. In the sequential protocol, subjects choose after knowing the strategies of others in prior stages subjects sum their points from each round, and multiply this by a conversion rate which transforms the points into a monetary payoff. The subjects were explicitly told they would be paid in cash after the experiment. So they understood earnings were a function of decision choices.
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We conducted over 16 experimental sessions, five in the US, nine in China, and two large sessions in Singapore to check the robustness of our findings. Six China sessions are low-stake, 3 are high-stake. 13 High-stake sessions have a tenfold increase in the conversion rate. Because we collected data in different countries, we took the following precautionary controls.
Instructions in a country were written in its primary language -English in Singapore and the US and Chinese in China. We used the reverse translation method to ensure Chinese instructions were equivalent to those in English. That is, an independent translator translated the instructions from English into Chinese and another independent translator from Chinese back into English.
Then, one of the authors who is fluent in both Chinese and English checked both translations.
The conversion rate was chosen to normalize average payoff so that subjects were paid about twice the minimal wage for the country. On average, US subjects earned US$11, Singapore subjects earned about S$10, and Chinese subjects about 24 and 320 Yuan Renminbi in the lowstake and high-stake games respectively. This latter earning is approximately equivalent to twomonth wages for a blue-collar worker.
RESULTS
within a game round. Since the results from the two exchange protocols are virtually identical, we conclude that subjects did not perceive a shadow of the future within a game round. 12 As suggested by Kee and Knox (1970) , such meaningful incentives allow subjects to clearly recognize the dangers and rewards of extending trust. 13 Our research budget did not allow us to conduct high-stake sessions in Singapore and US.
Altogether 386 subjects participated in the experiment (193 red and 193 blue subjects). Each subject made choices over 10 rounds. Figure 2 summarizes their choices in each of the four decision stages. As you can see, trusting behavior monotonically declines across decision stages while the degree of trustworthiness monotonically increases. Recall we examine trusting behavior in stages 1-3 and trustworthiness in stages 2-4. In each stage, there is a substantial decline in the proportion of trusting choices. On the other hand, the degree of trustworthiness increases marginally for stages 2-3 with a substantial increase in stage 4.
Seventy-two percent of the RED choices initiate trusting building in stage 1.
Correspondingly, 41% of the BLUE's choices and 20% of the RED's choices are of the trusting nature in stage 2 and 3 respectively. In stages 2 and 3, those who did not trust were also not trustworthy; they kept 95% and 94% of the property rights. Interestingly, in stage 4 only 78% of the property rights were claimed. 14 We formally test our hypotheses below.
We test whether subjects are trustworthy by examining the percentages of property rights claimed by BLUE players in stage 2. We focus on the trustworthiness of BLUE subjects who choose not to trust and immediately terminate the trusting building process. A more trustworthy BLUE should return a higher entrusted property rights to RED. A fully opportunistic BLUE takes 100% of the property rights. Table 1 reports the average proportion of property rights claimed along with the 95% confidence interval. It clearly shows BLUE subjects are largely opportunistic in stage 2. The average proportions claimed exceed 95% in all three countries.
Overall, these results support hypothesis 1a.
In spite of this lack of trustworthy behavior, we find some support for trusting behavior in Blue subject in stage 2 cannot be sure why a RED subject passes her property rights in stage 1.
She may pass selfishly so as to increase property rights for the possibility of claiming them in stage 3 or she may pass for the collective social gain. Clearly, the BLUE subject realizes this and is uncertain of RED's true intent. In stage 4, there is no such uncertainty. Clearly, subjects are more trustworthy in stage 4. Thus we find some support for hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 3 states trust increases with the difference in the expected return from trusting and the size of property rights currently held. Since this difference decreases over stages, we expect less trusting behavior in latter stages. is true across all countries. The average percentages of subjects trusting are 72%, 40% and 20% in stages 1, 2 and 3 respectively.
Hypothesis 4 predicts that stake size will not affect trusting behavior. Figure 4 shows subject behavior in the three high-stake trust games. Comparing Figures 2 and 4 , it is obvious that subjects exhibit significant more trust in the high-stake games. For example, in stage 3, RED subjects pass 80.3% as compared to 20.4% in low-stake games (a simple proportion test indicates this difference is highly significant (p < 0.001)). This higher level of trust in stage 3 is also Table 3 . Hypothesis 5 suggests the expected use of a strategy in the next round depends on its use in the current round and increases with its current fitness relative to the fitness of other strategies. Mathematically, we model the proportion of strategy j in round t to be:
The model suggests the proportion of subjects choosing strategy j in a round is a function of the proportion of subjects choosing the same strategy in the previous round and the fitness of strategy j in the previous round relative to other strategies. α > 0 implies subjects show a tendency to repeat their previous choice regardless of the fitness from their previously chosen strategies. β >0 suggests subjects are more likely to pick a strategy j if they receive a higher fitness from the strategy relative to others. That is, trusting behavior is driven by fitness (i.e., subjects modify their behavior in respond to fitness changes if β >0). We test hypothesis 5 by examining whether α and β are significantly greater than zero. We run a nonlinear regression using data from Table 3 and report the results in Table 4 .
As shown, both RED and BLUE players tend to repeat their previously chosen strategies (α = 0.5262 (RED), p < 0.0001; α = 0.8209 (BLUE), p < 0.0001). In addition, results suggest RED players are sensitive to the relative fitness of trust (β = 0.2794, p < 0.0001). They trust if rewarded for the trust. However, we do not observe similar calculative behavior for BLUE players.
The behavioral difference in RED and BLUE players is interesting. We note that RED players are the initiator of the trust building process and own the original property rights of 4.
BLUE players, on the other hand, do not explicitly invest in the trust building process. Hence, RED players may expect a higher payoff from the trust building process than the BLUE players.
Consequently, they care more about the expected payoff than BLUE players.
Our results suggest the two sub-populations follow a different evolutionary trust building path. The evolutionary path of RED is governed by the relative fitness of trust while that of BLUE is not. We conjecture this is due to RED being endowed with an initial payoff of 4 before the trust-building process begins and hence this is a natural reference point to compare her actual payoff with. Consequently they are likely to be more conscious of the actual payoff. Conversely, BLUE does not have this initial endowment. And, BLUE appears to have a commitment to reward a trusting RED when he is certain of her trusting intention. Alternatively, one may interpret that RED has more power than BLUE in the sense that she can choose not to initiate the trust process without any inputs from BLUE. This difference in perceived power can cause her to be more sensitive to actual payoffs.
DISCUSSION
This research is designed to examine trust building in a population of strangers. We define a stranger as someone whom you interact with only once and know not their identity. We disentangle trusting and trustworthiness behaviors using a novel experimental design. We find players in the population are not trustworthy when they are uncertain about others' trusting intentions. Interestingly, even with a total lack of formal mechanisms, and little (if any) informal sanctions due to the minimum scope of social relations, we find evidence of trusting behavior.
Sub-populations however may follow different evolutionary paths of trusting behaviors. Some may trust based on its relative fitness and others may not. Results suggest sub-populations with the decision rights to initiate the trust building and those who hold the first rights to continue the process follow different evolutionary paths.
Methodological Issues
The experimental design allows us to differentiate and examine trust and trustworthiness through the choice set of subjects. Choices consist of two components -strategy (trust or not) and division of social gains (trustworthiness). Many previous studies fail to distinguish between these components of the trust process because they test trust using a sequential prisoner's dilemma design (Heckathorn,1988) . Results suggest there is value in separating these components since we do see divergence in behavior. For example, in the initial stage of our game there is significantly more trusting behavior than trustworthiness. We find a decrease in trusting behavior as the potential value of trust drops.
Our design uses a social exchange protocol in which players must decide what to do without knowing the choices of others (i.e., contingent strategy). Game theory predicts using this design should not alter the strategy choices of subjects. However, previous research in prisoner's dilemma games suggests that subjects are more likely to cooperate if they know the other is willing to cooperate (Kiyonari et. al (in press ); McCabe, Smith and LePore, 2000) . If this finding generalizes to our trust game then we should see more trust building behavior when subjects are provided with the choices of others in previous stages.
We test this empirically. 16 We ran two additional 20-subject experiments in the United States using a sequential exchange protocol to determine whether social exchange protocol has an impact on trusting building. That is, subjects were not asked for contingent strategies. In each stage, they were told the choice of their pair member in the previous stage. For example, if RED 16 We thank the reviewers and the editor for this suggestion. In addition to testing behaviors in different exchange protocols, this manipulation provides an indirect test of whether subjects can predict others' intentions. Figure 5 reports the results of these experiments. If we compare Figure 5 with Figure 2 , we see that subject behaviors are alike. At each of the four stages, the degree of exhibited trust and trustworthiness is very similar. It is as if subjects can predict the behavior of others without knowing their action choices.
Theoretical Implications
Our findings have implications for Granovetter's theory of embeddedness (1985) .
Granovetter suggests the network of social relations is an important determinant of trust between individuals. Macy and Skvoretz (1998) of trust is direct social contact. That is, one can only influence those with whom you have direct social contact. This is consistent with Frank's (1993) proposal that some strangers trust because of moral sentiments (e.g., compassion, altruism). They communicate these sentiments through non-verbal cues such as body language (e.g., facial expressions) and voice tone.
Our experiment design gives us control over these various explanations. There is no shadow of the future; subjects are told they will not interact with one another for more than one round. 17 Verbal or non-verbal cues are not possible because subjects do not play face-to-face and play is anonymous. Yet, we see a significant level of trust and non-negligible level of trustworthiness develop.
We conjecture the following. In our experimental setup, trusting may lead to higher payoffs, so it is not surprising to see people trust. In fact people seem to trust more when the likelihood of a greater payoff is higher. For example, RED subjects who trust in stage 1 have a higher probability of receiving a payoff greater than the non-trusting one of 4 relative to that of the trusting RED subjects in stage 3 receiving a payoff greater than the non-trusting one of 16.
Hence it is the promise of social gain that drives this trusting building process.
It is however more difficult to rationalize the significant level of trustworthiness behavior in the last stage. As discussed before, subjects at stage 4 exhibit the greatest level of trustworthiness because they are certain about the trusting intention of others. This suggests subjects possess a generalized morality that compels them to be nice to those whom they are sure were nice to them. As Frank (1993) points out people's moral sentiments may make emergence of such cooperative behavior among strangers possible. Such a population norm could be the 17 We take steps to ensure that subjects believe in the instructions. For example, they are explicitly told that they will only interact with one another once. Subjects are also told there are 10 RED subjects and 10 BLUE subjects in each room so that we have the required number of subjects to match them with each other for each round. We also have shown subjects our scoring sheet before the experiment which clearly shows the different pairings in each driving force behind developing trusting behavior. This finding is consistent with prior work on the effect of social uncertainty on trust building process (Kollock, 1994; Yamaguishi, Cook, and Watabe, 1998) .
Some have suggested that our trust game can be interpreted as a multi-stage dictator game. Clearly, our game at stage 4 is a single-stage dictator game (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1990; Forsythe, et. al, 1994; Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, and Smith, 1994; Hoffman, McCabe and Smith, 1996; Malhotra and Murnighan, 2000b) . 18 Thus it might be interesting to compare our results with those from single-stage dictator games. Payments to the respondents (or in our case the RED subjects) are often interpreted as altruistic behavior (Camerer, 2001) . At stage 4 of our game, this interpretation may not be appropriate because our stage 4 also contains trusting history from prior stages and subjects may want to reward this past trusting behavior.
We compute the mean proportion of payment to respondents in three similar studies that allow proposers to divide the property rights continuously from 0 to 100% (Forsythe, et. al, 1994; Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, and Smith, 1994; Hoffman, McCabe and Smith, 1996) . The mean payment to respondents is 17% and the modal response is 0% across 7 of the 9 experimental conditions. Our mean proportion is 22.6%. This is higher than that from the above three dictator game studies. We speculate that some BLUE subjects initially reward RED's trusting behavior because they are certain about their trusting intention. However, this effect wears off gradually over time. This conjecture is supported by the fact that our modal response in rounds 1-5 was round.
18 Kiyonari and Yamagishi (1997) devised an interesting variant of the dictator game in which the respondent has an option whether or not to trust the proposer for a division. In their studies, the respondent could opt out for a sure payoff, which is less than half of the proposer's property rights. They found more than 80% of their subjects trusting and the average division of the proposer was 42%. Compared to our results from stage 3 and 4, these were significantly higher trusting and trustworthiness behaviors. One reviewer suggests that this difference could be due to the fact that a truster's payoff is totally dependent on a trustee's action in their game whereas the same action 50% whereas in rounds 6-10 it was 0%.
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Overall, our results suggest a significant number of subjects exhibit "pseudo trust" when interacting with strangers. This pseudo trust is cultivated in order to harness a return in exchange for the risk taken in giving up property rights. As long as everyone takes this risk, it benefits the population because this pseudo trust increases social gain. This expectation becomes a selffulfilling prophecy or a population-level behavioral norm. For such a behavioral norm to develop, it is crucial that each player has the opportunity to regain the increased property rights.
This is the case in the first 3 stages of the game. Consequently, players who want to stop trusting are also not trustworthy. Hence, it is possible to have a population who exhibits "pseudo trust", but is not trustworthy.
To sustain the pseudo trust behavior of BLUE in stage 2, there must be a non-negligible proportion of RED subjects who trust in stage 3. These RED subjects clearly trust for social gains because they will not regain the property rights. Figure 2 shows about 20% of RED exhibit this trusting behavior. In a field study, Uzzi (1997) found similar behavior and attributed it to the embeddedness of social relations. Our results suggest embeddedness may not be necessary for such behavior. The result that 20% of our population trust for social gain without any formal enforcement mechanism or informal sanctions mirrors results of earlier studies. For example, similar to the dictator-type games discussed above, Camerer and Weigelt (1988) find about 17%
of their subjects exhibit this type of trust. These findings suggest about 15-20% of the subject population have a generalized morality for trust.
Our results suggest trustworthiness is not a necessary condition for the development of only accounts for one-tenth of a truster's payoff in our design. 19 In rounds 1-5, of the 354 times BLUE subjects passed in stage 2 and took in stage 4, 131 times (37.0%) they took 50% and 110 times (31.1%) they took 100%. In rounds 6-10, they took 50% 66 times (21.6%) and 100% 177 times (58.0%) out of 306 times. seemingly trusting behavior. Only two weak functional requirements are necessary: 1) an opportunity to regain property rights, and 2) an increase in social gain resulting in higher property rights. Thus the structure of the exchange context can play a major role in the degree of
trust. An exchange context that gives subjects the opportunity to credibly signal their willingness to trust and hence contribute to social gain can benefit both populations. The ability to leverage such an advantage in a trusting situation depends on the ability of the trustee to effectively use a detection strategy (Obell and Dawes, 1993; Frank, 1988 ). An effective detection strategy allows the trustee to interpret the signal unambiguously. Frank discusses detection strategies as involuntary physical movements (e.g., voice tone, body language). In our study, physical movements are not needed. It is the selection of the strategy itself that trustees use to determine whether trusters want to trust for social gain or selfishly. As previously discussed, choosing trust in stages 1 -2 does little to reveal your true intentions. But, choosing trust in stage 3 clearly signals you want to contribute to the social gains and then share them with others. The game structure prevents selfish players from choosing trust in stage 3 since they do not have an opportunity to regain property rights.
We observe subject trusting and trustworthy behaviors are similar across all three countries in the early stages. For example, the proportion of trusting behavior in stage 1 is around 70% in all three countries (see Table 1 ). Similarly, the proportion of property rights claimed in stage 2 is around 95% in all three countries. Table 2a shows there is also little difference across countries in trustworthiness in the later stages (except in stage 3 where the mean proportion claimed by China subjects appears to be lower, though it is above 90%). Table 2b shows the level of trust in the later stages is different across the three countries. In particular, China subjects appear to exhibit a slightly higher level of trust than the other 2 countries in stages 2 and 3. Future research should investigate this difference more formally.
Future Research
An interesting route to extend this research is to manipulate the social embededness.
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We can easily do this by varying the number of times each pair of players interact in each round and the probability of their rematch in the future rounds. In this study, each pair of RED and BLUE players interact once in each round and their rematch probability is zero in future rounds.
Another path to pursue is to modify the rate of social gain (see for example McKelvey and Palfrey, 1992) . In our study, social gain doubles every time a subject exhibits trusting behavior.
What kind of trusting behavior might emerge if the rate of social gain is increasing in the amount of trust developed? Such a pattern of social gain seems plausible and reflects a greater efficiency among players. For example, the property rights could be 8, 24, 96 in Stage 2, 3, and 4
respectively.
Another route is to modify the exchange context to eliminate the use of a credible signal by RED and a detection strategy by BLUE in stage 4. In its current form, the trust relationship ends in stage 4 with certainty. If this exchange only ends probabilistically, the ability of RED to send a credible signal and BLUE to detect the signal is considerably weakened. In this modified design, we expect less trustworthiness in stage 4.
Lastly, our results on stake size suggest another route of future research --why does stake size increase the level of trust? One possible explanation is that stake size changes the nature of social interaction. Subjects may feel a greater sense of reliance for each other in the high-stake games because they want to realize the huge increase in social gains. The penalty for non-trusting behavior is more costly. Consequently, they are more willingly to trust and reward trust.
Such behavior can occur if subjects develop an initial expectation for it, which later is confirmed by observed behavior (i.e., a self-fulfilling expectation).
achieved if the interaction is confined only to nearest neighbors compared to the interaction among strangers.
APPENDIX I
NAME _____________________ SUBJECT NO. ______
INSTRUCTIONS
This is an experiment in decision-making. The instructions are simple; if you follow them carefully and make good decisions, you could earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid to you in cash before you leave today. Different subjects may earn different amounts of cash. What you earn today partly depends on your decisions, partly on the decisions of others, and partly on chance.
There are 20 subjects in this room. Each subject has been randomly assigned a subject number. When we finish reading these instructions, 10 subjects will be told to go to another room. When this experiment begins, you will always be paired with a subject in the other room. You will never play with a subject in your room. The experiment will consist of 10 decision rounds. In these 10 decision rounds, you will be paired with each of the 10 subjects in the other room for 1 round. So you will always be paired with a subject in the other room, and you will never play with any subject more than once.
It is important that you do not look at the decisions of others, and that you do not talk, laugh, or exclaim aloud during the experiment. You will be warned if you violate this rule the first time.
If you violate this rule twice, you will be asked to leave, and you will not be paid. That is, your earnings will be $0.
Experimental procedure
Subjects will be randomly assigned to one of two rooms. Subjects in this room will belong to the "Red" group; subjects in the other room to the "Blue" group. Whether you belong to the Red or Blue group will be determined as follows. An administrator will circulate among you with a box containing numbered balls. As the administrator passes by, you select a ball from the box. If the ball you select is an even number then you will be a member of the Red group, and you will remain a Red member for the entire experiment. All Red members will go to the other room. If the ball is an odd number, you are a member of the Blue group, and you will remain a Blue member for the entire experiment. All Blue members will remain in this room.
In this experiment you will play the following game. First, you will be randomly matched with a subject of the opposite color. Hence a Blue member will always be paired with a Red member and vice versa. The following Figure shows how the game will work. Once the game reaches Stage 4, or a player "takes", subjects are awarded the points they earn for that round, and they move to the next round. In the next round they will play the same game, but they will be paired with a new player. Again, you will never play another subject more than once. We will continue this procedure for 10 rounds. Since we have two groups of 10 subjects and members of a group do not play against each other, none of your pair members have played against each other before.
In each round, to save time, you are asked to indicate what you would do if you choose "pass" in earlier stages of the game. For example, if a Red player chooses "pass" in stage 1, we will ask the player what she would do in stage 3. Similarly, if a Blue player chooses "pass" in stage 2 we will ask what they would do in stage 4. Note that the game may actually end earlier so your choice may be immaterial. For example, if a Red player chooses to "pass" in stage 1, and his Blue pair member chooses to "take" in stage 2, then the choice of the Red player in stage 3 is meaningless. The game has ended in stage 2. We ask you to tell us your future choices to save time in passing messages back and forth. After each round we will tell you your payoff for that round, and the choice of your pair member.
Payoffs
Your dollar earnings for the experiment are determined as follows. First, we will sum up your point earnings over the 10 rounds. Then we will multiply this sum by $0.10. We will pay you this amount when you leave the experiment. Note the more points you earn, the more money you will receive. 
SCORING SHEET FOR RED PLAYER
ROUND
